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Human Rights News

On the implications of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for the OSCE
Region, the Assembly proposes that consideration be given to the possibility of the European
Union's ESDP being available to OSCE and the United Nations for crisis management,
peacemaking and peacekeeping activities.
The Paris Declaration urges the OSCE to raise awareness by making delegations and
capitals more sensitive to the interplay between environmental and/or economic factors and
the security of the OSCE region.
On national minorities the Assembly strongly recommends to those participating States
that have not yet done so that they bring their legislation on citizenship into conformity with
international standards for the protection of persons belonging to national minorities,
particularly as regards the procedures for the acquisition or loss of citizenship.
The Assembly furthermore calls upon the participating States to reinvigorate their efforts
to implement their commitments regarding freedom of expression and free media, and to
actively support media independence and pluralism.
The Resolution on South Eastern Europe opposes ethnic Albanian groups in the former
Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, Kosovo and southern Serbia who have instigated violence
this passed year, condemns repeated acts of terrorism in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and calls upon the legitimate political representatives ofMacedonians, Albanians
and other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to focus on
continued political dialogue - and not violence - to resolve pressing issues and grievances
of ethnic minorities.
On developments in the North Caucasus the Assembly once again calls upon all parties
in the conflict to observe assiduously and conscientiously the territorial integrity of all
sovereign States in the region and to refrain from any actions that might contravene that
territorial integrity or undermine regional security. The resolution welcomes the return ofthe
OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya and expresses its expectation that the Assistance Group
- on the basis of its 1995 mandate - will be able to promote the peaceful settlement of the
crisis and stabilisation of the situation in the Chechen Republic.
Regarding the situation in Ukraine the Assembly expresses concern about the potential
loss of momentum in undertaking critical economic and political reforms in Ukraine as a
result of the dismissal of the reformist government of Viktor Yushchenko. The Assembly is
disturbed that the criminal investigation into the murder ofjournalist Georgiy Gongadze has
been obstructed by authorities and has not been carried out in accordance with the rule of
law.
V INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
ClaudiaMartin and Diego Rodriguez-Pinz6n*
A. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Since the last report produced on the Inter-American System, the Court has decided several
cases. In the second half of 2000, the Court ruled on the merits in Durandand Ugarte, and
CantoralBenavides, both against Peru, and Bdmaca Veldsquez vs Guatemala.In 2001, the
Court has adopted decisions on the merits in the cases of the ConstitutionalTribunal and
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Ivcher, both against Peru, Baena et al vs Panama, Olmedo Bustos et al vs Chile('Last
Temptation ofChrist'Case),and ChumbipumaAguirre etal.vs Peru('BarriosAltos'Case).
Moreover, the Court has ruled on reparations in PaniaguaMorales et al. vs Guatemala,
Villagrdn Morales et al vs Guatemala, and Cesti Hurtado vs Peru. For considerations of
space and relevance, this report will only focus on the decisions in the Baena, Olmedo
Bustos, and ChumbipumaAguirre Cases. The full text of the decisions can be obtained in
Spanish and English on the web site of the Inter-American Court at www.corteidh.or.cr
Baena et al vs Panama.Judgment on the merits
On 16 October 1990, the Coordinadorade Sindicatos de EmpresasEstatales, a group of
trade unions representing workers in the public sector, in particular State owned companies,
presented to the Government of Panama a list of petitions on labor-related issues. Those
petitions were rejected by the Government on 16 November 1990. As a result, the
Coordinadoracalled for a public demonstration on 4 December and a 24-hour work stoppage
for the following day. The demonstration, which was peacefully held, coincided with the
escape of the former head of the National Police Force, Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassdn,
who was imprisoned for challenging the authority ofthe civilian government. Herrera Hassin
took the principal barracks of the National Police Force during the night of 4 December and
part of the following day, until he was detained by the US armed forces and handed over to
the Panamanian authorities. The State considered that Herrera Hassin's activities were linked
to the work stoppage organised by the trade unions; therefore, to avoid any suspicions, the
trade unions suspended the stoppage early on 5 December. On 6 December, the Executive
Branch referred a draft law to the Legislative Assembly proposing the dismissal of all the
public employees who had participated in the organisation and implementation of the work
stoppage alleging that the workers' actions were aimed at overthrowing the constitutionally
installed Government. The law, identified as Law 25, was passed on 14 December and
authorised the retroactive application of its provision to the 4-5 December events. The
retroactivity of this legislation was permitted by Article 43 of the Constitution of Panama
according to which public order laws may be applied retroactively. In addition to authorising
the dismissal of public employees, Law 25 granted the Executive Branch the power to
determine the actions that would fall within the definition of 'acts contrary to democracy and
the constitutional order' and which would constitute the grounds for dismissal. Through a
resolution adopted on 23 January 1991, the Executive Power provided that 'acts contrary to
democracy and the constitutional order' encompassed abrupt stoppages and suspension of
activities in the public sector and that public employees who had promoted, convoked,
organised, or participated in such actions since 4 December 1990 would be subject to
dismissal. Law 25 also authorised the Executive Branch or the Directors of the State owned
companies or other governmental agencies to identify and dismiss the workers who had
participated in the organisation and implementation of acts contrary to democracy and the
constitutional order. Finally, the law modified the administrative and judicial proceedings to
challenge the dismissals, specially in relation to some of the workers who were protected by
a special legal regime.
In application of Law 25, 270 workers from State owned companies and other
governmental agencies were dismissed from theirjobs. Some of the workers were dismissed
before the law came into force and all of them were fired before the Resolution of the
Executive Branch defining the acts for which they were sanctioned was adopted. As required
by that law, most of the workers exhausted administrative remedies and then appealed the
rulings to a Chamber of the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to decide on labor-related issues.
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In the meantime, the Supreme Court of Panama in plenary had declared Law 25
constitutional, with the exception of the provision that granted authority to the Executive
Branch to define the scope of the acts that fell within 'acts contrary to democracy and the
constitutional order'. In application of this judgment, the Chamber of the Supreme Court
rejected the workers' appeals and ruled that the dismissals carried out under Law 25 were
legal. The decision by the Chamber of the Supreme Court was final and non-appealable.
After exhausting domestic remedies, the 270 workers dismissed from their public
employment brought a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. On 16
January 1998, the Commission referred the case to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights claiming violations to the following articles of the American Convention on Human
Rights: 8 (right to a fair trial); 9 (freedom from ex post facto laws); 10 (right to
compensation); 15 (right of assembly); 16 (freedom of association); and 25 (right to judicial
protection) in relation to Articles 1(1), 2 and 33 and 50(2) (duty of the State to comply in
good faith with the recommendations issued by the Commission in its reports). Furthermore,
it requested the Court to declare that Law 25 and Article 43 of the Panamanian Constitution,
which permit the retroactive application of laws, are incompatible with the Convention and
that they should be modified or repealed in accordance with Article 2 of the said Convention.
In addition, the Commission alleged that the State violated its duty to comply in good faith
with its international obligations in breach of Articles 33 and 50(2) of the Convention, when
it failed to implement the Commission's recommendations. The Commission also requested
the Court to order the State to reestablish the 270 workers in the exercise of their rights, to
make reparations, and to compensate the victims or their families for the acts committed by
its agents, as established in Article 63(1) of the Convention. Lastly, the Commission
requested that the State should be condemned to pay the costs and expenses of the
proceeding. In 18 November 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights dismissed the
preliminary objections submitted by the State of Panama and decided to continue with the
consideration of the merits of the complaint.
In its judgment on the merits, the Court addressed two general issues before deciding on
the alleged violations to the American Convention. First, the Court rejected the argument
made by the State that all facts denounced in this case were justified on the basis that the
State was facing an emergency situation. In that regard, the Court concluded that the State
never declared a state of emergency and notified the Secretary General of the Organization
of American States as required by Article 27 of the American Convention; therefore, the
Court analysed the violations alleged by petitioners without considering the limitations
allowed by that provision. Second, the Court considered whether the Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (hereinafter 'San Salvador Protocol') was applicable to the facts of this case. The
Commission argued that, in addition to other provisions of the American Convention, Law
25 affected trade union rights protected by Article 8 of the San Salvador Protocol. Panama
was not a State Party to the Protocol by the time the facts of the case took place, but it had
signed that treaty in 1988. On that basis, the Commission alleged, Panama had a duty not to
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty from the time it signed the Protocol, as provided
by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The dismissal of workers for
organising a work stoppage affected trade union rights and therefore violated that duty. The
Inter-American Court reasserted the general principle of good faith in the compliance of
international obligations and the duty not to frustrate the object and purpose of a treaty, even
from the signature of such an instrument. However, it concluded that since Panama had not
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ratified the San Salvador Protocol at the time the facts alleged in the case took place, it could
not attribute violations of that Protocol to the State.
Next, the Court analysed the alleged violation of Article 9 of the American Convention
on Human Rights which ensures the freedom from ex post facto laws. First, the Court
concluded that this provision was applicable to those administrative sanctions that, like
criminal ones, are utilised to punish an illicit conduct. In a democratic system, both
administrative and criminal sanctions must be regulated and known before the conduct that
triggers their application takes place. According to the 'principle of legality and nonretroactivity' enshrined in Article 9, the determination that a particular action or omission is
illegal and the sanctions it entails must be stated before an individual is punished for carrying
out the prohibited conduct. Individuals must be able to foresee the consequences of their
actions. Second, the Court appears to have concluded that the dismissal of the petitioners
were the type of administrative sanctions that fell within the scope of Article 9. On that basis,
it held that the retroactive application of Law 25 authorising the dismissal of workers who
participated in the work stoppage of December 1990 was a violation of that provision. The
retroactive application of the law is proved by the language of the statute itself and the fact
that the scope of the actions for which the workers were sanctioned - acts against democracy
and the public order- were only determined on 23 January 1991 by Resolution of the
Executive Branch.
The Court also found a violation of the rights to a fair trial (Articles 8 paragraphs 1 and
2) and to an effective remedy (Article 25), both protected by the American Convention on
Human Rights. The Court first analysed the application of Article 8 to administrative
disciplinary proceedings and concluded that state authorities must observe the right to a fair
trial in those type ofproceedings. Second, the Court held that both the procedural guarantees
ensured in paragraph 1 of Article 8 and those spelled out in paragraph 2 of the same provision
must be respected in administrative disciplinary proceedings. It is worth to note that
paragraph 1 of Article 8 refers to the procedural guarantees that States undertake to respect
in the determination of rights and obligations of a civil, labour, fiscal or other nature, and of
a criminal charge, while paragraph 2 includes procedural guarantees that are ensured only to
a person who has been charged with a crime. It looks like the Court considered that, when
an administrative sanction can be assimilated to a criminal sanction, due process rights
provided in paragraph 2 should be ensured in the application of such a measure. Following
that conclusion, the Court appears to have reasoned that since Law 25 provided for sanctions
similar to those of a criminal nature, the State should have respected the procedural
guarantees ensured in both paragraphs of Article 8. In particular, the State should have
provided workers with access to an administrative proceedings prior to dismissing them from
their employment. Panama argued that by the time the facts in this case took place, there
were no laws regulating public employment and that the State had discretion to hire and
remove public employees. Thus, authorities had no obligation to follow any prior
administrative procedure before dismissing the victims in this case. The Court considered that
a distinction must be drawn between the discretion to remove personnel on the basis of
necessity of the public service and the State power to sanction a public employee. In the
exercise of the power to apply sanctions, State authorities must respect the due process rights
protected by the Convention. In this case, the President of Panama concluded that the work
stoppage was linked with the activities carried out by Colonel Herrera HassAn and ordered
the dismissal of those workers who had participated in the stoppage, presuming their support
to the former military. Additionally, sanctions were applied to workers identified by reports
prepared by their superiors, without permitting the victims to defend themselves and
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challenge the conclusions as to their participation in the events that led to the massive
dismissals. Moreover, once sanctions were imposed, several victims filed administrative
appeals that were never decided by State authorities. Finally, the Court considered that given
the seriousness of the sanction, which implied the loss of the workers economic support and
the consequences that this situation entailed for them and their families, the State should have
ensured the victims the right to due process when deciding their dismissal. For those reasons,
the Court found that the State did not respect the right to a fair trial provided in Article 8 of
the Convention.
In relation to the violation of Articles 8 and 25 in the context of the judicial proceedings,
the Court established that workers exercised their judicial remedies in three situations: 1)
writs of amparo filed before the Supreme Court; 2) petitions requesting the
unconstitutionality of Law 25 also submitted to the Supreme Court; and 3) judicial appeals
against the decision of administrative authorities confirming the dismissals presented before
the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court, with jurisdiction to deal with labour-related
matters. Petitioners brought the writs of amparo to challenge the decision of labour courts
not to accept for review the workers' dismissals because Law 25 have deprived them of
jurisdiction to decide those cases. Since the Supreme Court limited itself to order those courts
to adopt a reasoned decision regarding their lack of jurisdiction but refused to address the
merits of the petitions, the Inter-American Court found that the victims did not have access
to an effective remedy. On the other hand, after the constitutionality of Law 25 was declared,
petitioners appealed to the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court to challenge the application
of the law to their own cases. This tribunal limited itself to conclude that being the law
constitutional, the dismissals were legal in the cases of those workers that appeared to have
participated in the work stoppage. It failed to establish in each case whether the particular
petitioner had committed the conduct punished by the Law. In fact, the tribunal did not have
access to the reports prepared by the authorities identifying the workers that had participated
in the events of 4-5 December, which were not even a piece of evidence incorporated in the
proceedings. Furthermore, it applied Law 25 without taking into account the fact that the
conducts for which the workers were sanctioned were not defined until a month and a half
after the events took place. Finally, the decision of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court
was final and non-appealable. For the above reasons, the Inter-American Court held that
victims in this case did not have access to judicial proceedings that ensure their right to a fair
trial and to an effective remedy as required by Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention.
Additionally, the Court reviewed the alleged violation of Articles 15 and 16 of the
Convention which protect the right of assembly and freedom of association, respectively. In
relation to the right of assembly, the Court found that the public demonstration of 4
December was carried out without interference from the state authorities and that it was even
protected by the public force. Moreover, according to Law 25, workers were dismissed for
organising and participating in the work stoppage of 5 December, but not as a result of their
participation in the events of the day before. Therefore, the Court held that there was no
evidence showing that the right of assembly of the victims was illegitimately restricted. With
respect to Article 16, the Court stated that this provision had to be analysed in light of the
right to organise and bargain collectively which includes the right to establish trade unions
without interference from the State. In addition, Article 16 encompasses the right to form
associations, subject to the restrictions authorised by that provision, and the freedom to join
or not to join those associations. Next, the Court held that Law 25 authorising a massive
dismissal of public employees and trade unions representatives constituted an interference
with the exercise of the right to freedom of association. To come to that conclusion the Court
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took into account the conclusions reached by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
and the ILO Committee ofExperts in the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,
which had previously ruled that those dismissals seriously compromised the actions of trade
unions and that, in consequence, those measures violated ILO Convention No. 98 on the right
to organise and bargain collectively. Once the interference was established, the Court
proceeded to consider the legality of such a restriction. In that vein, it analysed whether the
interference was established by law, justified on one ofthe grounds authorised by Article 16,
in particular public order, the protection of the general interest or the independence and
security of the State, and if it was necessary in a democratic society. The Court, though it
came close to consider that Law 25 did not meet the conditions required by the Convention
to be a legitimate measure to restrict freedom of association, it limited itself to hold that the
law was not needed to protect public order, it was disproportional to the end that it intended
to achieve, and, in consequence, it was not necessary in a democratic society.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the violations of the rights protected in Articles 9,
8(1), 8(2), 25, 15, and 16 constituted an additional breach of the general duties to respect and
ensure the exercise of the rights protected by the Convention, as provided in Article 1(1) of
that instrument. Also, by passing Law 25, the State failed to comply with the duty to adopt
measures to give effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the American Convention in
breach of Article 2 of that treaty. It is noteworthy the fact that the Court did not address the
request of the Commission to declare the incompatibility of Article 43 of the Panamanian
Constitution with the American Convention when considering Article 2. It only referred to
this petition in the section on reparations and it held that it was not necessary to review this
issue since it had already ruled on Law 25, which was the measure applicable to the facts of
this case.
The Court next considered the alleged breach to Articles 33 and 50(2) of the American
Convention. The Court held that Article 50(2), which regulates the elaboration and
transmittal to the State ofthe Commission's report with recommendations, was not applicable
to this case because the Commission, by submitting the case to the Court relied on this
tribunal to adopt a decision on the merits of the case. With respect to Article 33, the Court
reiterated its prior jurisprudence according to which States Parties to the Convention should
take into account the recommendations made by the Commission in its reports because this
organ has the power to monitor compliance with the obligations assumed by States when
ratifying the Convention. Moreover, States Parties to the Convention must make their best
efforts to implement the recommendations of the Commission in light of the principle of
good faith in the compliance of international obligations, as codified by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties. In the end, however, the Court concluded that it had
no power to review the actions of the State of Panama during the proceedings before the
Commission.
Finally, the Court ruled on reparations under Article 63(1) of the American Convention.
To ensure the enjoyment of the rights violated, the Court ordered the State to reinstate the
workers who are alive in the positions they held by the time they were dismissed or, if not
possible, to offer them employment alternatives that ensure the same working conditions,
salaries, and social security benefits. If this option is not applicable, the State should
compensate the victims for termination of employment, as provided by the domestic law of
Panama. Moreover, the State should award pension rights and other social security benefits
to the survivors of those workers who passed away. Second, the Court awarded compensation
to the victims or their heirs, including material and moral damages. Lastly, the Court awarded
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expenses and costs incurred by the victims and their representatives in the domestic and
international jurisdictions.
Olmedo Bustos et al vs Chile ('The Last Temptation of Christ' Case). Judgment on the
merits.
Article 19§ 12 of the Constitution of Chile authorises the establishment of a system of
censorship for the exhibition and publicity of cinematographic productions. In furtherance
of that provision, Decree Law No. 678 grants power to the Cinematographic Classification
Council to supervise cinematographic exhibition in Chile and classify films. In 1988, United
International Pictures Ltd. petitioned the Chilean Cinematographic Classification Council to
authorise the exhibition of the film 'The Last Temptation of Christ', but the request was
rejected. Later on, however, on 11 November 1996, following a further petition by United
International Pictures Ltd., the Cinematographic Classification Council reviewed the
prohibition to exhibit the same film and finally authorised its exhibition for an audience of
18 years of age or more. Against that decision, seven lawyers filed a protection writ ('recurso
de protecci6n') arguing that the content of the film affected the right to reputation of Jesus
Christ, the Catholic Church and themselves. The Court of Appeal of Santiago granted the
writ and annulled the administrative decision adopted by the Cinematographic Classification
Council lifting the ban on the exhibition of the movie. This decision was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Chile on 17 June 1997. Both decisions were based on the argument that
the film, by deforming and abusing the image of Christ, affected his honor and dignity, and
offended the sincere beliefs of those who based their faith in his person.
The case was brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which
referred it to the Inter-American Court on 15 January 1999. Before the Court, the
Commission argued a violation of Articles 13, 12, 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, which ensure the rights to freedom of thought and expression, freedom of
conscience and religion, and the general duties to respect and ensure the exercise of the rights
protected by the Convention, and to adopt the necessary measures to give effect to those
rights. As to the violation of the right to freedom of thought and expression, the Court held
that the decisions of the domestic courts in Chile constituted prior censorship, a measure
expressly prohibited by Article 13(2) ofthe American Convention. In addition, it underscored
that preventive measures that do not fall within the exception of paragraph 4 of that
provision, which permits censorship in public entertainment for the protection of minors,
infringe the right to freedom of expression. The decision of the Court implicitly rejected the
approach followed by domestic courts according to which opinions or publications that harm
the honor of others can be restrained through an injunction without violating the right to
freedom of expression, because judicial injunctions do not constitute prior censorship.
Next, the Court found no violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion
protected by Article 12 of the American Convention. The Court rejected the Commission's
arguments which sustained that the decision of the Chilean courts deprived the victims in this
case, and society as a whole, of access to information that could have allowed them to
maintain, change or modify their beliefs. Moreover, the Commission alleged, the decision
affected those who belong to other creeds than Catholicism or do not have religious
convictions, since they do not have access to the ideas expressed in a work or art with a
religious content. The Court reasoned that Article 12 'constitutes a far-reaching element in
the protection of the convictions of those who profess a religion and in their way of life'.
However, in the end it concluded that there was no evidence to sustain that any of the
freedoms embodied in that provision, including the right to maintain, change, profess or
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disseminate their religion or beliefs, have been affected by banning the exhibition of the film.
Additionally, the Court concluded that the State of Chile violated the general duties to
respect and ensure the right of petitioners to freedom of thought and expression, ensured by
Article 1(1) of the Convention, when it banned the exhibition ofthe film. In regard to Article
2, the Court held that the existing legislation in Chile, in particular Article 19(12) and Decree
Law No. 679, are incompatible with the standards of Article 13 of the Convention, because
they permit prior censorship of the exhibition and publicity of cinematographic production.
Though Chile had been in the process of amending those provisions, the challenged domestic
legislation was still in force. Therefore, there was a breach of Article 2 of the Convention.
In the end, the Court ruled on the measures of reparation to be awarded to the victims in
this case, as provided by Article 63.1 of the Convention. First, the Court ruled that to
guarantee the free and full exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression, the
State must amend the existing legislation that permits prior censorship and authorise the
exhibition of the film 'The Last Temptation of Christ'. Second, in regard to other measures,
the Court concluded that the judgment was, per se, a form of reparation and moral
satisfaction of significance and importance for the victims. Finally, the Court awarded the
expenses incurred by the victims to argue the case in the domestic and international
jurisdictions.
Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. vs Peru ('BarriosAltos' Case). Judgment on the merits.
The victims in this case, residents in the Barrios Altos neighborhood in Lima, were having
a fund-raising party when six armed individuals with their faces covered with ski masks
irrupted in the building. The attackers arrived in two vehicles equipped with police lights and
sirens. They asked the victims to lay on the floor and shot at them indiscriminately, killing
15 persons and seriously wounding another four. Judicial investigations and press reports
revealed that the attackers where members of 'Grupo Colina', an anti-subversive group
within the Armed Forces of Peru. Two weeks after the events, in November 1991, the
Peruvian Congress set forth an Investigation Commission to investigate the facts of this case
and establish the responsibility of those that participated in the extrajudicial executions. The
Commission initiated its activities, but it was later dissolved in April 1992, when then
President Fujimori ordered the Congress closed. The new Congress elected in November of
that year discontinued the investigation. Judicial action was not taken until 1995, when a
judge, at a request of a provincial prosecutor, opened a formal investigation against five
members of the Peruvian Armed Forces. While the investigation was being carried out, the
Peruvian Congress passed Law No. 26479, exonerating members of the armed forces,
security forces, and civilians from responsibility for the commission of human rights
violations carried out from 1980 to 1995. The law granted amnesty to those individuals who
were subject to criminal investigations or who were serving time in prison for violations of
those rights. The investigatory judge in charge of the criminal investigation decided that the
law was not applicable to the facts of this case because it was incompatible with the
Constitution and the international obligations to which Peru was bound, in particular the
American Convention on Human Rights. The decision was appealed to the Superior Court
in Lima and a hearing was scheduled to deal with the applicability ofLaw No. 26479. Before
the hearing was held, however, Congress passed a second law, Law No. 26492, providing
that Law No. 26479 was not subject to judicial review and that its application was mandatory.
Moreover, it extended the scope of the initial law by granting a general amnesty to those
members of the armed forces, security forces, or civilians who could be subject to an
investigation for human rights violations in the future, even if those violations had not yet
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been reported. On 14 July 1995, the Superior Court in Lima vacated the decision of the
investigatory judge and ordered the case to be definitely filed.
Several non-governmental organisations brought petitions to the Commission on behalf
of the victims or their next-of-kin, which were finally joined in one case. On 8 June 2000, the
Commission submitted the case to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights alleging
violations of Articles 4, 5, 8(1), 25, 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human
Rights. Initially, Peru argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the case
because the State had withdrawn its declaration recognising the contentious jurisdiction of
that tribunal. After the resignation of President Fujimori, the transitional Government elected
in Peru notified the Court that the withdrawal from that tribunal had been revoked and that
the initial declaration recognising the Court's contentious jurisdiction was fully reinstated.
Additionally, in February 2001 Peru accepted international responsibility for the human
rights violations resulting from the facts of this case. After hearing the Commission and the
victims' representatives, the Court declared that Peru violated the rights to life (Article 4),
personal integrity (Article 5), fair trial (Article 8), and judicial protection (Article 25) of the
victims who were executed or injured in this case. In addition, the Court ruled that Peru was
responsible for the breach of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention for the failure to respect
and ensure the rights protected by the American Convention and for passing amnesty laws
Nos 26479 and 26492.
Next, the Court held that the amnesty laws passed in Peru are incompatible with several
provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights. In particular, these laws impeded
the victims or their next-of-kin to exercise their rights to access to a court and to judicial
protection in violation of Articles 8(1) and 25 of that instrument. Moreover, the laws
prevented the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for the
extrajudicial executions and injuries caused to the victims in this case. Finally, by passing
those laws, Peru failed to respect the duty to adopt measures to give effect to the rights
protected by the Convention, in breach of Article 2 of that treaty. The Court also underscored
that any State Party to the American Convention that adopts amnesty laws will be in violation
of the international obligations assumed when ratifying that treaty. In light of the fact that
these laws contribute to the non-protection of victims and the perpetuation of impunity, they
are manifestly incompatible with the words and the spirit of the treaty. Furthermore, the
Court concluded that being the amnesty laws in Peru manifestly incompatible with the
American Convention, those laws have no legal value and, therefore, they do not constitute
an obstacle for the investigation of the facts of this case and the punishment of those
responsible. The Court appeared to declare the laws incompatible with the Convention even
beyond the facts of this case when it stated that in general these amnesty laws cannot be
applied to other cases to impede the investigation and punishment of human rights violations.
Finally, the Court addressed the argument made by the Commission regarding the violation
of the 'right to know the truth' which allegedly arises under Articles 8, 25, and 13(1) of the
Convention. In that regard, the Court, as in prior cases, denied the existence of an
independent right to truth and concluded that this right is subsumed in the scope of Articles
8(1) and 25 that guarantee the State's duty to investigate and punish those responsible for the
violation of rights protected by that treaty.
The Court considered that the parties in this case should determine the appropriate
reparations to the victims within three months. The Court will assess any agreement that the
parties reach to ensure that it is compatible with the relevant provisions of the American
Convention. If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the Court will determine the scope and
amount of the reparations in application of Article 63(1) of that treaty.
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B. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The following summary describes some of the most relevant activities of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). We have selected a few decisions in individual
cases that illustrate the standard setting work of the Commission. The full text of the
documents and cases mentioned below can be found in the following web site:
http://www.cidh.oas.org/
i OAS GeneralAssembly
The IACHR formally presented the Commission's 1999 Annual Report to the General
Assembly, which was held in Windsor, Canada in June 2000. The Commission also made
public during the General Assembly the following Special Reports: 1) Situation of Human
Rights in Peru; 2) The Human Rights Situation of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian
Refugee Status Determination System; and 3) The Situation of Human Rights in the
Dominican Republic.
The General Assembly adopted the following resolutions in the area of human rights and
humanitarian law: 'Evaluation of the workings of the Inter-American system for the
protection and promotion of human rights with a view to its improvement and strengthening',
'Promotion of and respect for international humanitarian law', 'Proposed American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations', 'Children and armed conflicts',
'Human rights defenders in the Americas: Support for the individuals, groups, and
organisations of civil society working to promote and protect human rights in the Americas',
'Observations and recommendations on the annual report ofthe Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights', 'Observations and recommendations of the member states on the annual
report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights', 'The human rights of all migrant
workers and their families', 'Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, "Convention of Bel6m do Pari"', and 'The
situation of refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons in the Americas'
ii On-site visit to Haiti
The Commission conducted an on-site visit to Haiti from 21 August to 25 August, 2000. The
purpose of the visit was to observe the human rights situation in Haiti, and to enhance the
cooperative efforts with the Haitian Government and civil society for the protection and
promotion of human rights in that country. The IACHR met with representatives of the
Haitian executive, legislative and judicial bodies and with various sectors of civil society,
including human rights organisations and other social and humanitarian welfare groups,
representatives of the Catholic Church, alleged victims of human rights violations,
journalists, and representatives from other international organisations. The Commission also
visited the National Penitentiary and the National Fort, a detention center for women and
children. The Commission received individual complaints ofhuman rights violations in Haiti,
and gathered information to prepare a special report analysing the human rights situation in
that country.
iii Special Report
The IACHR released, among others, the following Special Reports in 2000: 1) 'Report on
the situation of human rights of asylum seekers within the Canadian refugee determination
system'. This report examines a series of issues relating to the situation of human rights of
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persons subject to the refugee determination system of Canada. 2) 'The human rights
situation of the indigenous people in the Americas.' The report deals with the situation of the
indigenous peoples of the Americas, 'who generally, in addition to having been historically
dispossessed, today have the lowest levels of services, income, and access to opportunities
in their countries. Many continue to suffer discrimination'. 3) 'Third report on the situation
of human rights in Paraguay'. The IACHR visited Paraguay from 28 to 30 July 1999, to
observe the general human rights situation. Based on this visit, the Commission released this
report with the finding on the visit. Additionally, the IACHR released its Fifth Special Report
on the situation of human rights in Guatemala.
iv IndividualCases
One of the main functions of the Commission is to receive and decide individual
communications alleging violations of human rights in the States of the Americas. Some
interesting statistics on its work with individual complaints have been published. During the
year 2000 the Commission was precessing 930 cases. During that year the Commission
received 681 petitions, registered 110 new complaints, and published 23 reports on the merits
of cases. It closed 61 cases. It granted 52 precautionary measures, 12 regarding Colombia and
12 regarding the United States. 91 cases are being processed through the friendly settlement
procedure.
In 2000 the Commission submitted 5 cases to the Inter-American Court. In 1999 it had
submitted 7 cases to the Court. Among the recent cases decided by the Commission we must
mention the following:
1) The Commission continues to receive petitions regarding the rights of indigenous
communities. Among the 2000 admissibility decisions of the Commission is the Maya
Indigenous Communities andtheir members (Belize) (Report No. 78/00, Case 12.053) that
deals with alleged violations under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man. The petitioners argued the violation of the rights of the Toledo Mayan indigenous
communities regarding their lands and natural resources. The Commission argues that the
State granted numerous concessions for logging and oil development to developers on land
traditionally used and occupied by the Mayan communities, refusing to recognise the rights
of the Maya people over their traditional lands and causing them environmental harm.
2) The Commission continues to monitor the dramatic human rights situation in Colombia
through its individual complaint procedure. For example, it released, among others, its
decision on the merits in the case of the Riofrio massacre (Report No. 62/01, Case 11.654).
Similarly, it issued admissibility decisions in the cases ofthe massacres ofMapiripdn(Report
No. 34/01, Case 12.250) and La Granja,Ituango (Report No. 57/00, Case 12.050).
3) Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra (Guatemala), Report No. 4/01, Case 11.625: The
petitioners alleged that several articles of the Civil Code of Guatemala, which define the role
of each spouse within the institution of marriage, 'create distinctions between men and
women which are discriminatory and violate Articles 1(1), 2, 17 and 24 of the American
Convention on Human Rights'. In the admissibility phase of this case, the Commission dealt
with the notion of victim in the inter-American system. A friendly settlement was attempted
in this case and Guatemala did implement some, but not all, of the required changes to its
relevant national legislation. Because no amicable solution was reached, the Commission
issued its final decision finding several violations ofthe American Convention by Guatemala.
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In the decision on the merits, the Commission found that Guatemala violated Article 24
(equal protection of the law) of the ACHR. The Commission applied the 'reasonable and
objective criteria' also followed by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court
on Human Rights. In this regard the Commission stated that a 'distinction based on
reasonable and objective criteria (1) pursues a legitimate aim and (2) employs means which
are proportional to the end sought'. The Commission also referred to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to inform the interpretation of
Article 24 of the ACHR, as required by Article 29 of the ACHR.
The Commission also found a violation of Article 17 (rights of the family) of the ACHR.
It considered that the Civil Code impeded the ability of wife and husband to equally exercise
their rights and fulfill their responsibilities in marriage, as required by the Convention. The
Commission also informed the interpretation of Article 17 with Article 16 of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Finally, the Commission
found that the generic provisions contained in Article 1(1) and (2) of the ACHR were also
violated by Guatemala.
4) Marcelino Henriquez et al. (Argentina),Report No. 73/00, Case 11.784: This case dealt
also with the question of equal protection of the law recognised in Article 24 of the American
Convention. The Commission found that the case was admissible, but it considered that there
was no violation of the Convention after applying the above mentioned 'reasonable and
objective' test.
The petitioners argued that during the Argentinian dictatorship, the alleged victims 'were
incarcerated by order of a federal judge who was neither independent nor impartial and who
charged them with an offense criminalised in a law whose legal qualification made the law
itself a violation of the right to freedom of expression'. After the transition to democracy, a
law was enacted to provide for reparations for persons detained on orders of the executive
branch of government during the dictatorship. The alleged victims requested compensation
for the days they were held in custody under judicial orders from a judge. Their right to
compensation for an eight-day period during which they were in executive custody was
recognised, but the Government denied them any compensation for the court-ordered
incarceration. They went to court to appeal the government's decision and to have the law
declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it discriminated against them by making no
provision for their predicament. The courts that heard the appeal upheld the government
authorities' decision. The Commission rejected the claims of the petitioners considering,
among others, that the distinction made by the Sate was legitimate. The law provided for a
special administrative procedure for persons detained on orders of the executive branch of
government to seek compensation, but it did not deprive those other persons detained under
judicial orders to seek judicial remedies.

C. New Rules and Regulations of the Commission and the Court
Both the Commission and the Court recently adopted new rules of procedure. In a following
review of the inter-American system we will include a detailed reference to the importance
of the changes adopted. The mentioned regulations can be find in the above mentioned
websites for each organ.
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